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Abstract Although the credit ratings industry originated in the 1860s, it has developed dramati-
cally in the past two decades, driven by processes of disintermediation, globalisation, and
increased proportions of debt on corporate balance sheets. This growth has continued in this cen-
tury with the advent of structured ﬁnance products, which accounted for nearly half of the major
rating agencies’ income in 2007. Alongside these new service lines, sit a plethora of diﬀerent rat-
ings intended for diﬀerent purposes. This paper describes the role of the rating agencies and
their ratings, along with the structure of the industry and their developing service portfolio. The
importance of ratings to corporate treasury is described, along with the implications for treas-
urers of seeking a rating. Regulatory aspects concerning the industry are addressed. Finally, the
salient characteristics of ratings quality are described.
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THE RATING AGENCIES AND THEIR
RATINGS
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) provide an
independent evaluation of the probability of
default on bond issues based on their assessment
of an issuer’s ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
characteristics. As such, they provide
information to debt-market participants
beyond publicly available sources.1 The
borrower’s credit quality is then communicated
to the market by a scale of rating letters. The
rating scale ranks from AAA (very safe) to D
(defaulted). An important point in the rating
scale is BBB. Any rating of BBB or higher is
regarded as investment grade, which indicates a
reasonably safe investment; ratings below BBB
are regarded as a speculative investment (‘junk
bonds’). By law, many regulated funds are
only allowed to invest in bonds which have an
investment grade rating. In addition, pricing
for investment grade issues is signiﬁcantly
better than for non-investment grade issues.2
Thus, receiving and maintaining an investment
grade rating is crucial for most issuers.
Consequently, CRAs play an important role in
the functioning of credit markets for a wide
range of stakeholder groups: issuers, investors,
regulators and a range of other parties who
make use of credit ratings.
The ratings industry is eﬀectively an
oligopoly, with two CRAs — Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) — accounting for 80
per cent of the market share, while Fitch
Ratings, the third largest CRA, accounts for
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15 per cent.3 In the past decade, CRAs have
demonstrated signiﬁcant growth in income and
proﬁtability: Moody’s and Fitch have nearly
tripled their revenues between 1999 and 2005,
while S&P, the largest CRA, has almost
doubled its revenues.4–6 This development is
driven by globalisation of credit markets,
increases in disintermediation and changes in
the capital structure of corporations. On a
worldwide basis, issuance of rated public
securities has risen at a compound annual rate
of 22 per cent over the last ﬁve years.5
Despite this growth, CRAs have been the
subject of ﬁerce criticism from commentators,
politicians, regulators and market participants,
most recently because of their role in the US
subprime mortgage crisis of 2007. Previous
concerns included the inability to foresee the
1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis or the failure of
prominent companies such as Qualcomm,
Parmalat and the US energy corporation Enron
in the early part of the 21st century.
Paradoxically, issuers of debt securities,
investors and government regulators (ie the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
the USA and the Financial Services Authority
in the UK) have increased their reliance on the
opinions of CRAs for corporate ﬁnancing,
investment decisions and risk management.7
Van Roy8 reports that the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision is increasing the role
given to CRAs in its revised capital adequacy
framework (Basel II) by basing its standardised
approach for credit risk measurement on
external credit ratings.
THE SERVICE PORTFOLIO OF CRAs
The CRAs’ main business is rating various
types of debt securities. Ratings include long
and short-term issue ratings, issuer ratings and
sovereign ratings. Historically the unique
selling proposition of CRAs was to distil a
mass of information on the borrower to create
a simple rating of its credit quality. However,
CRAs have moved away from simplicity of a
single rating and now rate default probability,
loss given default, implied state support,
liquidity and insurance claims paying ability.
Alongside corporate bond ratings sit
structured ﬁnance products. Demand for
structured ﬁnance ratings has grown rapidly
over the past few years. Due to the complexity
of structured ﬁnance products, ratings have
become increasingly important in this area.
Structured ﬁnance ratings represented 47 per
cent of Moody’s global ratings income in
2006.9 However, the subprime crisis has hit the
agencies hard: the decline in the issuance of
structured ﬁnance products has reduced their
revenues considerably. In the ﬁrst quarter of
2008, Moody’s reported a decrease of 57 per
cent in revenue from global structured ﬁnance
(69 per cent for US structured ﬁnance), which
led to an overall decline in operating income of
35 per cent compared with the same period last
year.10
CRAs oﬀer various ancillary business
services ranging from provision of market data,
ratings of funds and equities to ratings advisory
services and risk management solutions.
Although there is some concern that these
services could inﬂuence the CRAs’
independence, as yet they do not form a
signiﬁcant part of the CRAs’ revenues. For
example, in 2006, Moody’s Investors Service
(MIS), the ratings subsidiary of Moody’s
Corporation, derived approximately 86 per
cent of its revenue from issuer payments for
credit ratings. Nearly all of the remaining 14
per cent of its revenue came from fees paid by
institutional investors and issuers for credit
research and data products. Less than 0.5 per
cent was received from advisory services.11
THE IMPORTANCE OF RATINGS
Ratings reduce the information asymmetry
between the investor and the issuer as CRAs
have access to non-public information. The
ratings therefore provide investors with
additional information, beyond that which the
sophisticated investor can glean from published
sources. CRAs also have the resources to cover
a wide range of bonds both nationally and
internationally. In today’s global capital
markets, the number of debt issuers and issues
usually exceeds by far the resources of most
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investors. Ever more complex ﬁnancial
products such as asset-backed and derivative
securities require in-depth specialist knowledge
that most investors do not have. Therefore,
ratings provide users with valuable information
for their investment decision.12
Regulatory requirements have also
contributed to the increased importance of
ratings. Many regulators, responsible for
ensuring the safety and soundness of banks,
brokers, insurers and mutual funds rely on the
information provided by ratings to fulﬁl their
tasks to determine capital adequacy, or the
range of bonds in which regulated funds are
allowed to invest. For example, the Basel II
Framework for the International Convergence
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards
(Basel II) uses ratings to determine credit risk
and capital adequacy.13
Credit ratings are also beneﬁcial for issuers as
access to most public capital markets requires a
rating. Unrated securities usually have to be
placed privately, meaning that the suitable
investor base is much smaller. In addition, most
investors adopt investment policies limiting
investment in unrated debt securities. Research
has shown that 88 per cent of US and 84 per
cent of European investors refer to ratings in
their investment guidelines. Ratings are most
frequently used to establish minimum rating
requirements for bond purchases. Most ratings
guidelines refer speciﬁcally to ratings from
S&P and Moody’s. 14 Although most investor
guidelines only require one rating,15 the
majority of investors like to see two or more
ratings,16 so that most issuers regard being
rated by two agencies as a de facto
requirement. Moreover, rated securities
usually achieve a better pricing than unrated
securities. Studies have shown that unrated
bonds sell for higher yields than most rated
bonds.17
Credit ratings are also the most important
determinant of spreads. The higher the rating,
the better the pricing. Figure 1 shows the
average spreads on Eurobonds during the
period 1991 to 2001.18 Note the steep increase
in spreads for bonds that fall into the
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Figure 1: Average Eurobond spreads per ratings category, 1991–2001
Adapted from Gabbi, E. and Sironi, A. (2002) ‘Which factors aﬀect corporate bond pricing? Empirical evidence from
Eurobonds primary market spreads’, University of Bocconi working paper, available at: http://www.uni-bocconi.it/
doc_mime_ view.php?doc_id=16240&doc_seg_id=1 (accessed 10th May, 2008).
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speculative ratings category (below BBB–).
A huge cultural divide exists between
investment grade and non-investment grade
securities throughout the credit world. This rift
is driven by what CRAs say. In particular, it
has implications for what markets can be
tapped for funding; the enormous pricing
divide; and signiﬁcant variation in covenants
and security given.
IMPLICATIONS OF BEING RATED
Commissioning a rating has six principal
implications for the issuing organisation:
. costs;
. impact on ﬁnancial position;
. Basel II framework;
. multiple ratings;
. unsolicited ratings;
. commitment.
First, maintaining a rating requires a substantial
commitment of funds and senior management
time. Depending on the type and size of the
issue, rating fees can be substantial. Table 1
reports the annual fee levels paid by issuers to
CRAs.
In addition, commissioning a rating requires
the treasurer to provide the CRA’s analytic
staﬀ with considerable information about the
organisation and its future plans and strategies.
This process involves a considerable amount of
senior management time. If, as increasingly the
case, the borrower seeks to engage more than
one CRA, this process will have to be repeated
as CRAs’ independence rules forbid analytic
staﬀ contact with other CRAs.
Secondly, issuers should be aware that
changes in ratings can have a considerable
impact on their ﬁnancial position. Quite often
credit and debt agreements contain speciﬁc
clauses, so-called rating triggers, which get
‘triggered’ when the rating falls below a certain
threshold, usually investment grade. These
rating triggers range from requiring a company
to pay more interest or pledge collateral to
repay the loan in full. The eﬀect of such ratings
triggers can be devastating: under a worst-case
scenario, once the company’s debt is
downgraded by a CRA, the company’s loans
become due in full; as the troubled company is
likely incapable of paying all of these loans in
full at once, it is forced into bankruptcy. In
addition, research has shown that
announcements of rating downgrades do not
only have a negative eﬀect on bond prices, but
also on stock prices. Conversely, ratings
upgrades have no eﬀect on bond or share
valuations.19,20 A recent study investigated the
eﬀects of rating changes on credit default swaps
(CDS) spreads.21 It also observed a signiﬁcant
eﬀect for negative rating events, but
insigniﬁcant market reactions for positive
events. Downgrades by Fitch exhibited no
signiﬁcant impact on the stock and CDS market
whereas reviews for downgrades by S&P and
Moody’s were associated with a signiﬁcant
eﬀect. This demonstrates that the markets
regard ratings issued by the two major CRAs
more highly than those of the smaller agencies.
Thirdly, credit ratings are also used to
determine risk weights applied by banks in
corporate lending under Basel II. Speciﬁcally,
Basel II requires banks to base their risk
allocations using individual borrower
assessments. Consequently, a corporate
borrower with a favourable credit rating will
justify an advantageous probability-of-default
assessment and consequently incur lower
borrowing costs.
Fourthly, issuers should consider the risks
and beneﬁts of engaging more than one CRA.
Each CRA has its own ratings methodology
and may assess a security diﬀerently from other
CRAs. While earlier research has shown that in
Table 1: Annual fees payable by issuers
Level of fees p.a. (£) Frequency (%)
<15,000 4
15,000–30,000 13
30,000–60,000 18
60,000–20,000 27
>120,000 38
Total 100
Adapted from Duﬀ, A. and Einig, S. (2007) ‘Credit Rating Agencies:
Meeting the Needs of the Market?’, ICAS, Edinburgh, p. 69.
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the case of split ratings, the lower rating
determines the market pricing,22,23 more recent
research has found that the pricing is set by the
average of the two ratings.24,25 Regardless of
which scenario is applicable, obtaining a second
rating has been shown to have a positive
expected return even if the pricing is
determined by the lower rating, as bond issues
with two identical ratings have yields
signiﬁcantly lower than issues receiving such a
rating from only one CRA.26 This proves that
investors perceive value when companies are
rated by more than one CRA.
Fifthly, not all published ratings have been
commissioned by an issuer. Some ratings utilise
only information from public sources, without
access to the issuer’s senior management. These
ratings are usually termed ‘unsolicited’, and are
largely viewed with contempt by issuers.
However, CRAs undertake such ratings to
broaden their coverage of an industry, and
provide investors with the beneﬁt of additional
investment information. A signiﬁcant problem
is that unsolicited ratings are generally not
labelled as such, which makes it diﬃcult for
users of ratings information to assess whether a
rating includes valuable information from an
issuer’s management not within the public
domain.
Finally, being rated is not a one-oﬀ
investment, but a long-term commitment.
Although issuers can terminate their rating
agreements at any time, CRAs will, in most
cases, continue to rate the securities on an
unsolicited basis for the life of the issue. In such
an event, the rating is only based on publicly
available information, with no input from the
issuer side. Thus, the issuer has no opportunity
to present additional information to the CRA
or to correct misinterpretations. Moreover,
investors expect ratings to be continued for the
life of the issue. Terminating a rating
relationship with rated issues outstanding might
send the wrong signals to investors. Therefore,
commissioning a rating creates a ﬁnancial
commitment, with long-term consequences
beyond the short-term need to raise debt on
public markets.
(SELF)-REGULATION OF CRAs
In the light of previously mentioned well-
publicised corporate failures, market
participants, regulators and professional bodies
have become more interested in the function
and operation of CRAs. In June 2003, the US
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)
issued a concept release considering the role
and function of CRAs.27 Areas of concern
were the lack of competition in the CRA
market, insuﬃcient transparency of the CRAs’
rating processes, potential conﬂicts of interest
and the lack of an overseeing authority. After
signiﬁcant consultation, the USA has opted for
formal regulation, with the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act 2006, aiming to improve
the quality of ratings by fostering competition,
transparency and accountability in the credit
rating agency industry.
While the USA has chosen a regulatory
approach, Europe and other parts of the world
have opted for self-regulation. After
consultation with market participants, the
International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) issued a CRA code of
conduct28 with the support of the Committee
of European Securities Regulators (CESR), the
Financial Services Authority and the SEC. All
of the major rating agencies have signed on to
its provisions.29 At the heart of the IOSCO
Code is a disclosure mechanism to monitor
compliance: CRAs have to disclose how they
implement the various provisions of the
IOSCO Code and they also have to disclose
where practices deviate from the IOSCO
Code.
Professional bodies of corporate treasurers
have also been active in self-regulatory
approaches. The UK’s Association of
Corporate Treasurers and its equivalents in
France, the Association Franc¸aise des Tresories
D’Enterprises and the USA, the Association of
Finance Professionals, have published a draft
‘Code of Standard Practices for Participants in
the Credit Ratings Process’. This extends the
idea of best practice not just to CRAs but to
other market participants such as issuers.
In December 2006, CESR published their
Duﬀ and Einig
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ﬁrst report on the compliance of CRAs with
the IOSCO Code.30 CESR concludes that
CRAs largely comply with the IOSCO Code,
with the exception of their failure to identify
unsolicited ratings and in some instances the
lack of separation of ancillary services from
ratings services. In 2007, CESR extended its
consultation to examine structured ﬁnance
ratings.
Despite these consultations, the eﬀect of
greater regulation on the industry is uncertain.
As ratings constitute only an opinion, it is
plausible that making the CRAs more
accountable may induce them to be more
defensive in their decisions. This is analogous to
defensive medicine, whereby the practitioner
undertakes a range of unnecessary treatments
and examinations to immunise themselves
against litigation. In the case of CRAs, the
emphasis becomes on the analysis of historic
ﬁnancial results. So the most valuable element
of the rating, the professional judgment of the
analyst, is lost.
RATINGS QUALITY
Motivated by the rapid growth of the ratings
industry, operating in an environment of only
limited regulation, Duﬀ and Einig31 consider
the characteristics of ratings quality. Using a
series of interviews with a broad range of
market participants, ﬁnancial managers,
institutional investors and other interested
parties, and a questionnaire survey sent to 2,450
individuals representing users of CRA services,
14 characteristics of ratings quality are
identiﬁed.32 These are summarised in Table 2,
along with their rank, and the level of
consensus among participants.
The most important characteristics relate to
external perceptions of the credibility of the
CRA to the market. This might be expected as
CRAs are reputational intermediaries, who risk
their reputational capital by warranting
borrowers’ ﬁnancial projections. Furthermore,
as ratings quality is not directly observable,
market participants’ perceptions of the standing
of agencies are critical. A CRA needs to
Table 2: Questionnaire results for ratings quality characteristics
Characteristics Description Mean Consensus
Reputation The credibility of the CRA to third parties 4.69 Very high
Trust The degree of trust that exists between the CRA and 4.67 High
issuers and investors
Values and norms Those ethical values and organisational norms market 4.36 High
participants expect in a CRA
Timeliness The willingness of the CRA to upgrade/downgrade 4.15 High
a rated security
Transparency The clarity of decision making by CRAs, and quality of 4.10 Low
communication to users
Expertise The ability of the CRA to make competent and informed 3.92 Very high
decisions about the probability of default
Methodology Those processes the CRA uses to assess the probability 3.82 Very high
of default
Issuer orientation The ability to provide high levels of service to issuers 3.76 High
Cooperation Eﬀective communication between the CRA and 3.75 Very high
issuers and investors
Investor orientation The ability to provide high levels of service to investors 3.73 Very high
Independence The ability of the CRA to make objective decisions about 3.70 High
the issuer
Responsiveness Aﬀective relations between the CRA and issuers and 3.57 Very high
investors
Internal process Eﬀective internal processes to manage staﬀ and their 3.52 Very high
work within the CRA
Service portfolio The ability of the CRA to provide specialised, ancillary 2.96 Very high
services
Mean scale from 5 (very important) to 1 (not important)
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operate with complete integrity to be eﬀective
in the market. This is especially the case as the
CRA is privy to conﬁdential (inside)
information concerning the issuer.
Just below these characteristics, lie issues
relating to the expertise of the CRAs and their
ability to communicate decision making to
market participants. The relationship issues play
a subtle but important role in interactions
between CRAs and market participants. For
example, treasurers complain that CRAs seek
an almost immediate response from corporates
to draft credit reports and press releases that
give the impression of having been drafted
hurriedly and inaccurately. Communication,
however, is a two-way process, and corporate
management can in some instances achieve a
higher rating (notching up) by providing good
presentations to the CRAs, which will have a
positive eﬀect on spreads at issuance and
secondary trading.
Finally, the least important characteristic
relates to the service portfolio provided by
CRAs. Evidently, user groups would prefer
CRAs to focus their energies on corporate and
structured ﬁnance ratings, and not allow
themselves to be distracted by the provision of
other unwanted, but potentially lucrative
services.
Ratings work is essentially a labour-intensive
exercise. It becomes a challenge for the major
CRAs to maintain ratings quality in the face of
rapid growth in the publication of ratings, an
increased service portfolio, signiﬁcant staﬀ
turnover, and a potential regulatory burden.
For corporate treasurers, the consequences are
likely to include turnover in analytic staﬀ,
which necessitates re-educating the CRA in the
company’s business.
CONCLUSIONS
The ratings industry has grown rapidly in
recent years, and a proliferation of diﬀerent
ratings exist for diﬀerent purposes. However,
these diﬀerent ratings and the methodologies
employed by diﬀerent CRAs are not always
understood. Ratings are frequently used as a
benchmark by investors and other market
participants, and changes in the published
rating could have unforeseen adverse
circumstances for the borrower.
Increasingly, borrowers employ more than
one CRA to provide an opinion of the credit
quality of their debt security. This means that
treasurers need to be aware of the costs of
servicing several CRAs, as each will expect to
be dealt with on an individual basis. In
addition, staﬀ turnover within CRAs will
mean that from time to time, new analysts will
need to be re-educated in the business of the
issuer.
Regulation remains a contentious issue, with
the US subprime mortgage crisis renewing calls
for greater regulation of CRAs’ work.
Although regulation may sound like a panacea
to the credit market’s problems, it could lead to
a situation of defensive ratings whereby CRAs
fearing regulation cannot exercise their
professional judgment. However, the operation
of formal regulation in the USA will inevitably
have an impact on European markets, as CRAs
are pan-national entities. The eﬀects of formal
regulation on CRAs and their relationship with
corporate treasury are yet to be seen.
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